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Fedorenko v. United States: A New Test for
Misrepresentation in Visa Applications
In Fedorenko v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court upheld an order of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals revoking petitioner's
certificate of naturalization when his service as a Nazi concentration
camp guard was discovered. The rulings of both courts were based on
Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,2 which
confers on the United States Attorneys the duty to sue for cancellation of
citizenship if it was illegally procured or procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation. 3 The Fifth Circuit agreed
with the litigants that the controlling legal standard was set forth by the
Supreme Court in Chaunt v. UnitedStates.4 To establish the materiality of
a failure to disclose, 5 the Chaunt test requires the Government to prove

1 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976).
3 Id. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656 restored the authority
to revoke an "illegally procured" naturalization. The first statute authorizing revocation of
naturalization, Act of June 29, 1906, § 15, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 601, allowed the Government to seek denaturalization on grounds of either "fraud" or "illegality." In 1952, the grounds
for denaturalization were changed to "concealment of a material fact" or "willful misrepresentation," Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340(a), 66 Stat.
163, 261. In proving "concealment of a material fact" or "willful misrepresentation," the Government had to prove that the naturalized citizen acted with intent. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2950, 2982. This was a
difficult burden on the Government. Id. On the other hand, illegal naturalization has been
said to occur when some statutory requirement which is a condition precedent to naturalization
is absent. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1916). Illegality can be proven with
objective evidence whereas fraud requires proof of the defendant's state of mind. Therefore,
Congress saw a need to retain illegality as a ground for deportation so that the U.S. immigration
laws could be more effectively enforced. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1961] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2950, 2982-85.
4 364 U.S. 350 (1960). In Chaunt, the United States alleged that the defendant concealed
and misrepresented his record of arrests, his membership in the Communist Party, and his intent to keep his Hungarian citizenship. See text accompanying notes 23-24 and 78-81, infra.
5 A standard of materiality is required because some misstatements are irrelevant and
deportation or denaturalization entail severe consequences. See 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,
Immigration Law and Procedure, § 20.4b, at 20-13, -14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gordon &
Rosenfield]. However, "materiality" has not been well defined. The Supreme Court in Chaunt V.
United States said that a misstatement is material if disclosure would have justified denial of
citizenship or lead to other facts that would justify denial of citizenship. 364 U.S. at 353. But,
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1962), stated that a
misstatement was material only if the true facts would have led to denial of citizenship. See
Gordon & Rosenfield, supra. Examples of material misstatements include any misrepresentation that causes the alien to be placed in a preference quota or to be exempt from quotas when
the alien truthfully belongs in a nonpreference quota. Such misrepresentation would include
giving a false identity, place of birth, or family status (i.e. brother, cousin, etc.). The conceal-
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either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted the denial of citizenship or (2) that the disclosure might have
been useful in an investigation possibly6 leading to the discovery of other
facts warranting denial of citizenship.
The Fifth Circuit found that an accurate depiction of Fedorenko's past
would have resulted in an inquiry that might have justified the denial of
a visa.7 Therefore, the nondisclosure was material under the second
Chaunt test. The Supreme Court, however, found it unnecessary to decide whether the materiality precepts of Chaunt, developed in the context
of citizenship applications, also govern false statements in visa applications. 8 Instead, the Court held that Fedorenko must be denaturalized
because the unlawfulness of his initial entry caused his certificate of naturalization to be "illegally procured." 9
Feodor Fedorenko was a Ukrainian who entered the Russian army
in 1941 and served until his capture by the Germans. He was then selected for training as a concentration camp guard and, in 1942, was assigned to the Nazi camp at Treblinka, Poland where he worked during
the years 1942 and 1943. Petitioner was transferred several times and
eventually was able to pass as a civilian.10
In 1949, Fedorenko applied for admission to the United States
under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (the DPA),1 1 which allowed for
the emigration of war refugees without regard to conventional immigration quotas. Individuals who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil populations. . ." or who had "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces
. . . in their operations . . ." were specifically excluded from the Act's

definition of eligible displaced persons. 12 To qualify under the terms of
the Act, Fedorenko lied about his wartime activities on his visa application. He was granted a DPA visa and resided uneventfully in the United
States from 1949 to 1969.13

In 1969, petitioner applied for naturalization and again failed to
ment of conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude is also material. IA Gordon & Rosenfield, supra, § 4.7c(4) at 4-57 to 4-64.
6 364 U.S. at 355.
7 United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1979).
8 449 U.S. at 509.
9 Id. at 514.
10 Id. at 494.

11 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June 16,
1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219.
12 The Displaced Persons Act incorporated the definition of eligible persons from the Con-

stitution of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (IRO). See id. § 2.
The IRO Const., 62 Stat. 3037-3055 (1946), was ratified by the United States on Dec. 16, 1946
(T.I.A.S. No. 1846) and became effective on Aug. 20, 1948. The definition of displaced persons
excludes "any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second
world war in their operations against the United Nations."
62 Stat. 3051-3052 (1946).
13 449 U.S. at 496.
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disclose his guard service in his application and to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) examiners. He became an American citizen in
1970. Seven years later, the Government filed this action to revoke
Fedorenko's citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a) on the ground that he
had procured it by concealment and misstatement of material facts.14
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled for
Fedorenko. 15 The court found that the actual facts concealed were not
in themselves sufficient for the denial of citizenship and therefore were
not material under the first Chaunt test. The court interpreted the second
Chaunt test to require proof that the concealment of the facts prevented
an investigation that would have revealed facts warranting a denial of
citizenship. In short, the district court held that both branches required
a showing that "the true facts would have warranted denial of citizenship." ' 6 Because the district court questioned the Government's evidence of petitioner's ineligibility for a DPA visa, it concluded that
Fedorenko would not have been excluded for his involuntary guard service. 17 In addition, the court determined that disclosure would have
prompted an investigation, but the investigation would not clearly have
uncovered other facts justifying denial of the application.',8 Finally, the
court relied on its equitable discretion to protect petitioner's citizenship.
The source of such authority was found by analogizing denaturalization
proceedings to judicial determinations of eligibility for citizenship, in
which equitable circumstances are typically considered. '9
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court's interpretation of the second Chaunt test was wrong as a matter of law.2 0 Although
the court noted the potential ambiguity in the language of the test, it
reasoned that Chaunt should be construed so as to maintain the independence of its two components. 2' Thus, the Government must demonstrate
only that an accurate disclosure would have led to an inquiry which
22
might have exposed damaging facts.
This analysis resembled the Supreme Court's application of the materiality standard to the facts of Chaunt. In that case, the appellant failed
to divulge his minor arrest record but did disclose his membership in an
14 Id. at 497.

15United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
16 Id. at 916. The court here adopted the interpretation of the Chaunt test that was ap-

plied in United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962) and United States v. Riela, 337
F.2d 986 (3rd Cir. 1964).
17 Id.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 918-20.

20 597 F.2d at 951.
21 Id. at 950-51.
22 Id. at 951. The court noted that if it were to hold any other way, the government would
be required to carry out three very difficult tasks: 1) to conduct an investigation into the past,
2) to discover ultimate facts warranting disqualification, and 3) to prove those facts in court by
clear and convincing evidence.
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organization strongly influenced by communism. 23 The Government neglected to follow up on his communist associations. The Court reasoned
that there was no basis for believing the Government would have made
further inquiry about the arrests, since they stemmed from Chaunt's
political activism.2 4 Thus, the relevant issue is not merely whether an
ultimate basis for denial exists, but also whether disclosure would have
prompted further investigation.
The court of appeals also reversed the lower court on the issue of
equitable discretion in denaturalization. The Fifth Circuit ruled that a
court does have authority to consider the facts and circumstances in determining whether an individual meets such requirements for naturalization as good moral character; however, once it is established that a
25
person does not qualify, a court has no power to ignore the defect.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 to resolve two questions:
whether petitioner's failure to disclose, in his application for a visa to
come to this country, that he had served during the Second World War
as an armed guard at the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka, Po-

land, rendered his citizenship revocable as 'illegally procured' or procured by willful misrepresentation of a material fact, and if so, whether
the District Court nonetheless possessed equitable discretion to refrain
from entering2 7 udgment in favor of the Government under these
circumstances.

Although the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision cancelling Fedorenko's certificate of citizenship, the Court based its decision
on different grounds.
The Court explicitly recognized that the interests of both the citizen
and the Government in a denaturalization action are of the greatest import. 28 As a result, any such case must be examined within the framework of two lines of precedent. Because the right to citizenship is
precious, the Government carries a heavy burden of proof.29 To justify
revocation of citizenship, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and
convincing. 30 On the other hand, the integrity of the naturalization process demands strict compliance with the terms and conditions specified
by Congress, 3' since Congress alone possesses the constitutional power to
prescribe rules for naturalization.3 2 Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall noted that "no alien has the slightest right to naturalization
unless all statutory requirements are complied with; and every certificate
364 U.S. at 354.
Id. at 355.
25 597 F.2d at 953-54.
26 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
27 449 U.S. at 493.
28 Id. at 505.
29 Id. citing Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
30 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 125 (1943). The United States failed to
prove with the requisite degree of certainty that petitioner illegally procured his citizenship.
31 449 U.S. at 506.
32 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
23
24
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of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the governits cancellation unless issued in
ment may challenge it . . .and demand
33
accordance with such requirements."

There was no dispute that petitioner Fedorenko willfully misrepresented facts about his wartime activities in his application for a DPA visa
in 1949.3 4 The Court found the following DPA language to be applica-

ble: "Any person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the
purposes of gaining admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the United
States."135 Because this provision applies only to misrepresentation of mattrial facts, 3 6 the Court had to ascertain the materiality standard by
which petitioner's false statements were to be judged.
The Court first concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether
the Chaunt materiality test should be extended to deception in visa applications.3 7 The Court implied that distinctions existed between citizenship and visa applications which may militate against employing the
same rule in both situations. 3 8 The issue in the instant case was the law9
fulness of the citizen's initial entry, a question not presented by Chaunt.a
Rather, the Court decided that materiality of deception in a visa
application must be measured with regard to its effect on the applicant's
admissibility into this country. 4° The Court stated that "[a]t the very
least, a misrepresentation must be considered material if disclosure of the
true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa."'41 Section
2(b) of the DPA provided that individuals who "assisted the enemy in
persecuting civil populations ... 42 were ineligible for visas. Testimony
in the district court indicated that, in practice, this provision was interpreted to include concentration camp guards, regardless of whether their
service was voluntary or involuntary. 43 Moreover, the fact that the language of 2(b) contained a limitation of voluntariness compelled the conclusion that Congress deliberately omitted the limitation in 2(a), making
all persons who fall within the literal wording ineligible. 4 4 Based on the
statutory language and the testimony of a DPA expert, the Court deterU.S. at 506, quoting United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
34 449 U.S. at 507.
35 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013.
36 The Court stated that the principle of materiality governing the denaturalization stat33 449

ute should also logically govern this provision of the DPA. Both statutes are directed toward
willful misrepresentation. 449 U.S. at 507 n.28.
37 449 U.S. at 508.
38 Id. at 508-09.
39 Id. at 508.
40 Id. at 509.
41 Id.
42 Section 2(b) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 incorporated by reference this definition of "displaced person" found in Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization, supra note 12, 62 Stat. at 3051.
43 449 U.S. at 511.
44 Id.at 512.
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mined that but for Fedorenko's deception, he would have been unqualified for a DPA visa as a matter of law.
Because Fedorenko's visa was invalid, the Court decided he was
inadmissible under the express terms of the DPA. Section 10 of the DPA
made all displaced persons applying under the Act subject to all immigration laws. 45 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 required
an applicant for citizenship to be lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence, 4 6 which in turn necessitated a valid visa. 47 Petitioner lacked such a visa and therefore failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for naturalization. 48 This rendered his citizenship
49
revocable as illegally procured under 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a).
Finally, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that district courts
lack equitable discretion to enter judgment for a citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material
facts. 50 The Court relied on prior cases, which had settled that
[a]n alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can
rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by
Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce 5the
legislative will in respect of a
1
matter so vital to the public welfare.

Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals revoking
52
Fedorenko's citizenship as illegally procured.
To understand the significance of the Supreme Court's disposition
of Fedorenko, it is necessary to examine the development of the materiality
standard in denaturalization proceedings. The Constitution confers on
Congress the authority "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."15 3 In 1906, widespread abuses in the naturalization of aliens
prompted Congress to enact procedural reforms under this power. 54 The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1906 included a specific provision
permitting court actions to revoke naturalization on the ground of fraud
or illegal procurement. 55 In 1952, Congress restated this critical fraud or
illegal procurement language to allow for revocation of citizenship procured "by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresenta45 Id. at 515.
46

8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1429 (1976).

47 Id. at § 1181(a) (originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924, ch. 90,

§ 13(2), 43 Stat. 161 (repealed in 1952)).
48 449 U.S. at 515.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 516.
51 Id. quoting United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. at 474-75.
52 The Court noted that its resolution of the case made it unnecessary to decide whether
the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted the Chaunt materiality test. 449 U.S. at 518 n.40.
53 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
54 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596.
55 Section 15 of the 1906 Act provided that naturalization could be revoked "on the
ground of fraud."
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tion. ''56 Congress intended to make certain that intrinsic as well as
extrinsic fraud was covered and to make no substantial change in the
amenability to denaturalization for fraud. 57 The specific authorization
to revoke for illegal procurement was then restored in 1961.58 In 1912,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the first denaturalization statute in Johannessen v. United States, 59 stating "it makes nothing
' 60
fraudulent or unlawful that was honest and lawful when it was done."
It simply deprives a person of "a privilege that was never rightfully
6
his.", ,
Because the aim of the 1906 legislation was to deal with extensive
frauds and irregularities, the courts generally were predisposed toward
permitting denaturalization. 62 Courts presumed materiality was essential because of the severe consequences involved in denaturalization and
deportation. 63 However, there has been little consistency in the case law
concerning a standard of materiality. Even where a uniform test has
been theoretically accepted, judicial application has varied in accordance with the prevailing political climate. In a few early decisions, the
Supreme Court failed to focus on the degree of wrongdoing in the misstatement and approved denaturalization because the final hearing had
not been held in open court, 64 or because a certificate of lawful arrival
had not been attached to the naturalization petition. 65 The Court
viewed naturalization as having been illegally procured when the prereq66
uisites had no existence in fact.
In 1943, a change in this trend was marked by the denaturalization
case, Schneiderman v. United States. 67 In that case, the Court recognized
that citizenship once granted should not be revoked absent the clearest
sort ofjustification and proof. The Court placed a heavy burden on the
Government: its evidence had to be clear, unequivocal, and convincing
to justify revocation. 68 Since Schneiderman, the number of denaturalization suits has declined, in part due to the greater difficulty in meeting
this stricter burden of proof.6 9 The Schneiderman decision however has not
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 83-414, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 261
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976)).
57 3 Gordon & Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 20.4b at 20-13.
58 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656.
56

59 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
60 Id. at 242.
61

Id. at 242-43.

62 3 Gordon & Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 20.3 at 20-11.
63 Denaturalization is the revocation of citizenship conferred on a person after birth. Deportation involves the removal of an alien from this country. See Comment, Misrepresentation
and Materiality in Immigration Law--Scouring the Melting Pot, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 471, 48788 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
64 See, e.g., United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
65 See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928).
66 243 U.S. at 475.
67 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
68 Id. at 125.
69 See 3 Gordon & Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 20.5d(3) at 20-34.
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helped to clarify the legal issues surrounding the determination of materiality in the citizenship process. The lower courts have failed to apply a
test of materiality consistently. Moreover, these decisions did not distinguish between the types of deception specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
Charges of willful misrepresentation or concealment and illegal procurement have often been joined in one complaint, 70 and judges have not
expressly identified the basis for their decisions. Nor have courts focused
on the stage of the citizenship process at which the deception occurs.
The Supreme Court first grappled with the definition of materiality
injohannessen v. United States, 71 a 1912 denaturalization case. There the
Supreme Court held that "an alien has no moral nor constitutional right
to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by -false evidence or the like, an
imposition has been practiced upon the court, without which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been granted." 72 This
standard did not have to be construed broadly; the concealed facts in
Johannessen would have foreclosed the defendant's naturalization. Other
courts found the pertinent test to be whether the failure to disclose obstructed an avenue of inquiry which might conceivably have led to collateral information of greater relevance. 73 Materiality consisted of more
than a showing of mere potential to thwart an investigation but less than
a finding that the investigation would have revealed possible grounds for
74
denial.
A similar pattern developed in deportation cases involving questions
of materiality. 75 While materiality was easily established in cases where
exclusion would have resulted from an accurate disclosure, conflicting
standards appeared when the facts were less clear. 76 One view followed
the reasoning of the denaturalization cases, emphasizing the importance
of the investigative process. 77 Another concentrated on the effect of disclosure on the ultimate outcome. 78 A third approach narrowed the test
by requiring the government to show that the undisclosed fact had precluded an inquiry by the INS, and that such an inquiry might have re79
sulted in the discovery of facts relevant to a possible denial of entry.
In 1960, the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Chaunt v.
United States,80 establishing a. two-part materiality test. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had held in accordance with the general
70 Id. § 20.4(c) at 20-19.
7' 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
72 225 U.S. at 241.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833
(1963); United States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956);
Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956).
74 Comment, supra note 63, at 486-87.
75 Id. at 488.
76 Id.
77

Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808, (7th Cir.), aft'd, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).

78 Leibowitz v. Schlotfeldt, 94 F.2d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1938).

79 Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951).
80 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
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view that materiality existed and revocation was warranted if disclosure
might have prompted further questioning.8 1 The Court reaffirmed the
view that materiality was present where the concealed truth would have
justified denial of citizenship-the first prong of Chaunt. Second, it stated
that a deception is material if its disclosure might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship.8 2 Thus, the Court seemed to require a finding that
a further inquiry would have occurred.8 3 The Court adopted a compromise between the two extremes recognized in prior cases. Revocation of
naturalization would not be permitted for every deceit that deprives the
Government of an opportunity to investigate, regardless of its ultimate
effect. The Government, however, would not have to prove that the false
statement would have been determinative of eligibility had the truth
been disclosed.
Confusion in the definition of materiality continued after the Chaunt
holding. The first part of the Court's test in Chaunt had merely restated
settled law. Courts differed, however, in their interpretation of the ambiguous wording of the second part of the Chaunt test.8 4 In UnitedStates v.
Rossi,85 decided less than two years after Chaunt, the Ninth Circuit stated
the test of materiality to be whether the truth would have led to denial of
citizenship. 8 6 Rossi had used his brother's name on his visa application
to avoid the Italian immigration quota. The court said materiality was
to be determined by the bearing that the misrepresentation had on the
right to enter the country.8 7 Because the Government failed to prove
that the quota had been oversubscribed or that any investigation would
have occurred if Rossi had given his true name, revocation would not
have been warranted under either Chaunt test.8 8 On the other hand, the
Second Circuit has held that a fact is material if the misrepresentation
closes to the Government an avenue of inquiry which might conceivably
lead to collateral information of greater relevance.8 9
81
82
83
84

Comment, supra note 63, at 491.

364 U.S. at 355.
Comment, supra note 63, at 492.
In fact, the district court in Fedorenko appeared to misapply the second Chaunt test by
requiring the Government to prove the existence of ultimate facts warranting denial of citizenship and then prove that disclosure might have led to these ultimate facts. 455 F. Supp. 893,

915-16 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
85 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
86 Id. at 652 (quoting 364 U.S. at 355).
87 299 F.2d at 652.

88 Id. at 653-54.
89 314 F.2d at 118, citing Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956) which stated the following:
Upon analysis [of materiality], the issue is not whether naturalization would have
been denied appellant had he revealed his numerous arrests, but whether, by his
false answers, the Government was denied the opportunity of investigating the
moral character of appellant and the factors relating to his eligibility for
citizenship.
227 F.2d at 784.
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Courts in deportation cases have used the Chaunt test as well. 90 In
the 1961 case of Langhemmer v. Hamilton,9 1 the applicant concealed his
membership in the Communist Party. Disclosure would have placed
him in a class of aliens excluded by law from admission.9 2 The First
Circuit concluded that this information was material; if the applicant
had revealed his membership, the resulting inquiry would have unearthed facts warranting his exclusion. 93 The court rejected the applicant's argument that a misrepresentation is not material unless the alien
would definitely have been excluded on the true facts. In 1974, however,
this argument was accepted by the Ninth Circuit in La Madrid-Perazav.
INS. 94 That court ignored the existence of the second test of Chaunt and
cited Chaunt for the proposition that the fact is material only if the truth
would have resulted in exclusion. 9 5 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has also
arguably misinterpreted Chaunt. In Kassab v. INS,96 the court said that
materiality existed if the truth might have led to further inquiry and the
discovery of facts warranting exclusion. 97 The Chaunt test is stricter because it seems to demand proof that an investigation would have taken
place.
The Supreme Court opinion in Fdorenko failed to clarify the materiality standard in immigration law. To reach a decision based on "illegal
procurement" the Court had to first decide whether the misrepresentation in the visa application was material. If so, the visa was invalid and
petitioner did not satisfy the essential statutory prerequisites for citizenship. The Court noted that since materiality is required under the denaturalization statute, logic dictates that it should also be a necessary
finding under the DPA provision which excludes persons who make willful misrepresentations. 98 Yet in determining the proper materiality standard the Court ignored precedent which has consistently judged
materiality according to Chaunt. Indeed, the district court, the court of
appeals, petitioner, and the Government all presumed Chaunt's
applicability.
The Court instead adopted an approach to materiality which is indistinguishable from the first part of Chaunt. A misrepresentation is material under the new standard if "at the very least,

. . .

disclosure of the

90 Comment, supra note 63, at 496.
91 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961).
92 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C) (1976).
93 295 F.2d at 648.
94 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit, which had followed Chauni in United
States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962), failed to do so in La Madn'd-Peraza v. INS.
95 Comment, supra note 63, at 498. The Ninth Circuit, while citing Chaunti as the controlling authority, actually based its decision on a definition of materiality found in the labor regulations. The regulation in question provided its own test of materiality: whether "if the correct
facts had been known a certification could not have been issued." 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(g) (1972).
96 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966).
97 Id. at 807.
98 449 U.S. at 507 n.28.
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true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa." 99 Under
Chaunt, materiality is present where the applicant fails to disclose facts,
which, "if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship."'' 0 0 The
Court could easily have reached the same result by applying Chaunt. The
misrepresentation in the visa application could have been considered material, as was done under the new test. This would have subjected
Fedorenko's certificate of citizenship to revocation under the denaturalization statute on the basis of willful misrepresentation. As Justice Blackmun stated in a concurring opinion, the Court followed "the essential
teaching of Chaunt." ° 1 He expressed "regret only for its unwillingness to
say so."102
No apparent and persuasive reasons exist for the Court's reluctance
to rely on Chaunt here. Although the Court may be trying to avoid the
confusion surrounding Chaunt, it was unnecessary to go this far to do it.
Lower courts had agreed upon the first branch of Chaunt in theory and in
interpretation even before its reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in the
Chaunt decision. The ambiguity in Chaunt existed in its second prong,
which was immaterial to the Court's determination of the Fedorenko case.
Although the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of
whether Chaunt also governs false statements in visa applications, it raised
the issue because of some perceived distinctions between the deception in
Chaunt and in the instant case. Specifically, Chaunt presented "no question concerning the lawfulness of [the alien's] initial entry into the
United States."' 0 3 Justice Blackmun's concurrence answered this argument well:
I fail to see any relevant limitation in the Chaunt decision or the
governing statute that bars Chaunt's application to this case. By its
terms, the denaturalization statute at the time of Chaunt, as now, was not

restricted to any single stage of the citizenship process . . . nothing in
the language or import of the opinion suggests that omissions or false

statements should be assessed differently when they are tendered upon
initial entry into this country. If such a distinction was intended, it has

eluded the several courts that unquestioningly have applied Chaunt's materiality standard when reviewing alleged distortions in the visa request

process. 104
The distinction between deception at the visa stage and the citizenship
stage is not only unpersuasive, but is also unworkable. An applicant who
misrepresents facts in his visa application is likely to repeat the misrepresentation in his application for citizenship. In addition, the naturalization process is an ongoing process. It will often be impossible to pinpoint
precisely when the deception occurred. If the misrepresentation has been
99 Id. at 509.
100 See 364 U.S. at 355.
101 449 U.S. at 526 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 508.
104 Id. at 519 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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continuing, the courts will be forced to apply different standards to the
visa stage and the citizenship stage.
The Court's analysis may have been based on an unexpressed distinction between misrepresentation that directly causes the denaturalization and misrepresentation that indirectly leads to denaturalization
because it causes the citizenship to be "illegally procured." Charges of
misrepresentation and illegal procurement have not been treated separately in prior decisions, probably as a result of their interrelationship.
Such a distinction would be impractical because both charges are usually
joined in one complaint. A possible justification among the grounds for
denaturalization in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) would be the Court's belief that
decisions in the lower courts could be simplified if based on matters of
law rather than findings of fact. However, the inherent difficulties in
attempting to draw a line between misrepresentation cases and illegal
procurement cases would engender rather than alleviate confusion. For
example, the Court in Fedorenko still had to address the issue of materiality even in deciding on illegal procurement grounds. If setting a standard of materiality is unavoidable, it seems desirable to have courts
apply one uniform standard.
Another explanation for the Court's reasoning in Fedorenko is that
the Court was retreating from the second half of Chaunt, at least in visa
cases, and thus did not want to rely on it. This may be justified by the
ambiguity in and misapplication of part two of Chaunt. However, Chaunt
represented a balance struck between the interests of the alien and the
Government. Reliance on only the first Chaunt test would upset that balance in favor of the immigrant. The second component allows the Government to denaturalize a citizen with a reduced showing of deception.
The case law has recognized that this is necessary to preserve the integrity of the naturalization process. When materiality focuses on whether
disclosure would have prompted an investigation rather than on whether
disclosure would have affected the ultimate outcome of the process, the
applicant may be punished for the act of deception apart from its effect
on his citizenship. Otherwise, an applicant can profit by lying, he could
avoid immediate disqualification at the minimum, and if the deception is
later unearthed, the burden of proof would rest on the Government.
Justice Marshall may have drafted this narrow holding to avoid
strengthening Chaunt, while at the same time placating the majority of
the Court. By using a standard similar to the first part of Chaunt, the
Court adhered to rigorous standard of proof. Justice Blackmun contended this was proper because citizenship rights would be in danger if
"naturalization can be revoked years or decades after it is conferred, on
the mere suspicion that certain undisclosed facts might have warranted
exclusion." 1 5 Such an interpretation of materiality would also simplify
the task of the lower courts by limiting their discretion and by permitting
105 Id. at 525-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

FEDORENKO V. UNITED STATES

reliance on a body of precedent in which the sole determinant would be
whether the true facts justified denial.
Less significance could be drawn from Fedorenko if the analysis is
construed to be merely a way to decide the case on the narrowest possible
ground. The result may be based only on the construction of the DPA,
and perhaps the majority actually did not intend to affect the future
validity of Chaunt.
The Supreme Court in Fedorenko v. United States created additional
uncertainty and dispelled none of the existing confusion over the effect of
deception in the naturalization process. The Court ostensibly based its
holding on a narrow ground: the statutory language of the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948. The question of materiality nevertheless had to be
confronted and instead of building on its own precedent, the Court chose
to adopt a new test for misrepresentation in visa applications. By avoiding the materiality standard set forth in Chaunt v. UnitedStates, the Court
may have cast doubt on the viability of that decision. The Court's use of
a test very similar to the first part of Chaunt implies that the Court may
be retreating from the wording of the second half of Chaunt, at least in
regard to visa application cases.
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